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Abstract 
In online interactions in general, but especially in 
interactions between buyers and sellers on internet-
auction platforms, the interacting parties must deal 
with trust and cooperation problems. Whether a rating 
system is able to foster trust and cooperation through 
reputation and without an external enforcer is an open 
question. We therefore explore through ecological 
analysis different buyer and seller strategies in terms of 
their success and their contribution to supporting or 
impeding trust and cooperation. In our agent-based 
model, the interaction between a buyer and a seller is 
defined by a one-shot trust game with a reputation 
mechanism. In every interaction, a buyer has complete 
information about a seller's past behavior. We find that 
cooperation evolves under two conditions even in the 
absence of an external sanctioning authority. On the 
one hand, some minimal fraction of buyers must make 
use of the sellers’ reputation in their buying strategies 
and, on the other hand, trustworthy sellers must be 
given opportunities to gain a good reputation through 
their cooperative behavior. Despite the apparent 
usefulness of the reputation mechanism, a small 
number of deceitful sellers are able to hold their 
ground. 
Problems of Trust and Cooperation 
Internet-auction platforms represent markets in which a 
multitude of transactions between anonymous buyers 
and sellers are conducted every day. Due to conditions 
of asymmetric information, the parties to the 
interaction must address trust and cooperation 
problems. Mostly, a seller deals with this problem by 
insisting on payment in advance, thereby, protecting 
himself from deceitful buyers. The seller ships the 
good only after receiving payment from the buyer. The 
buyer therefore must be confident of the seller’s 
willingness to ship the good. The interaction between 
the buyer and the seller can be formalized as a trust 
game which can be described as follows (see Figure 1). 
First, the buyer decides whether to trust the seller or 
not. If the buyer decides not to trust the seller, the 
interaction terminates and both agents receive 
punishment (P) for the missed opportunity. If the buyer 
decides to trust the seller, a transaction takes place. In 
this transaction, the buyer transfers a valuable 
commodity to the seller (e.g. money). Then the seller 
decides whether to honor the trust shown by the buyer 
and to repay it with a commodity of equivalent value 
(e.g. a mobile phone) or to abuse the buyer’s trust and 
to keep the money. If the seller decides to honor the 
trust shown by the buyer, both agents receive reward 
(R) for mutual cooperation. If the seller deceives the 
buyer, the seller receives the gain from temptation (T) 
while the buyer loses with a sucker's payoff (S) 
(Dasgupta 2000, Coleman 1990, Buskens and Raub 
2002, Bolton, Katok and Ockenfels 2004). 
 
 
Figure 1: Trust Game 
 
From a rational-choice perspective, neither the seller 
nor the buyer in a one-shot trust game would have an 
incentive to behave cooperatively. A “rational” seller 
would not ship a good that has already been paid for (T 
> R) and a “rational” buyer would not enter the 
transaction in anticipation of this outcome (P > S). The 
same logic applies when the buyer is the second mover. 
One might therefore ask how internet-auction markets 
can evolve at all and why they are not disrupted by 
dishonest behavior. 
The social-dilemma situation described above is 
comparable to the well-known Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
For each of two interacting agents, it is more rational to 
defect while mutual cooperation would mean that both 
parties were better off. As we have learned from 
Axelrod’s (1984) computer tournaments, this socially 
inferior outcome can be avoided if the “shadow of the 
future” is high enough to foster mutual cooperation. An 
agent’s expectation that it will interact with the same 
partner an indefinite number of times and will have the 
possibility to both reciprocate cooperation and retaliate 
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would be in a one-shot game. 
However, these conditions can not be assumed to be 
given in an actual internet-auctions market. Repeated 
interactions between the same two parties are rather 
rare (Resnick and Zeckhauser 2002), as market 
transactions are mostly processed in one-shot 
interactions. Furthermore, since market participants are 
anonymous, the possibility of either reciprocating or 
retaliating is very limited. The simple institution of a 
rating system can therefore play a crucial role in 
allowing the market to function. 
Introducing Reputation 
Rating transactions and then making these ratings 
available to all interested actors is an important factor 
in promoting cooperation. In repeated one-shot 
dilemma games, reputation is a substitute for the 
iteration of games involving the same two parties. 
While there is no possibility to reciprocate the 
cooperation or to retaliate for the defection of one's 
partner in previous interactions, reputation does allow 
for indirect sanctioning or reciprocity respectively 
(Nowak and Sigmund 1998, Wdekind and Milinski 
2000, Leimar and Hammerstein 2001, Bolton, Katok 
and Ockenfels 2005). However, two assumptions have 
to be met in order for a reputation system to work in 
the way it is intended: (1) Past behavior must be a 
predictor for current behavior and (2) a reputation 
index must capture past behavior (see also Snijders and 
Zijdeman 2004). 
Under these assumptions, a seller with a good 
reputation has behaved mostly cooperatively and has 
been rated accordingly, whereas a seller with a bad 
reputation has been evaluated negatively for her 
fraudulent past behavior. A buyer having to decide 
whether to trust a seller or not is assumed to prefer a 
seller with a good reputation, since this seller is more 
likely to behave cooperatively again. This difference 
implies that sellers with a bad reputation are 
discriminated against and sanctioned (indirectly) for 
their past behavior. Analogously, sellers with a good 
reputation are rewarded. 
Buyers are thus able to protect themselves from 
exploitation by considering a seller’s reputation before 
conducting a transaction with that seller. If buyers trust 
more in suppliers with a good reputation, prefer to 
trade with them and are perhaps even willing to pay a 
higher price for transactions with them (premium for 
reputation), sellers have an incentive to invest in their 
reputations through cooperation. Sellers on the other 
hand can insist on payment in advance in order to rule 
out opportunistic behavior on the part of the buyers 
(Diekmann and Wyder 2002). 
Motivation for Simulation 
Experiments 
Empirical data from internet auctions support the above 
hypothesis of the price premium on reputation, 
suggesting that buyers are willing to pay an “insurance 
fee” to reputable sellers in order to reduce the risk of 
being deceived (Diekmann and Wyder 2002, Snijders 
and Zijdeman 2004, Berger and Schmitt 2005). But 
there are objections to the idea that the reputation 
system alone ensures the smooth functioning of the 
internet-auctions market. It has been argued that other 
protection, specifically the threat of external sanctions 
by the platform operator, is also necessary in order for 
cooperative interactions to evolve (Brinkmann and 
Meifert 2003). Whether cooperation can evolve 
endogenously in the presence of only a reputation 
system and in the absence of an external enforcer is 
therefore a matter of debate. Hence, this question can 
not be answered through observations of real auctions 
on existing internet platforms because the threat of 
sanctions can neither be observed directly nor 
manipulated freely outside of an experimental setting. 
We therefore research this question with simulation 
experiments that reproduce the essential characteristics 
of internet-auctions markets. In a first passat 
researching this question, we start from the trust game 
with a simple reputation mechanism (Dasgupta 2000, 
Lahno 1995).  
In our simulation experiments, the assumption that a 
reputation index measures past behavior is entirely 
met. A buyer-agent rates a seller-agent positively, if the 
trust given by the buyer has been rewarded and rates 
the seller-agent negatively, if trust has been abused. In 
every interaction with a seller, a buyer knows the 
number of negative and positive ratings the seller has 
been given by other buyers. Although past behavior of 
an agent might be a good predictor for the agent’s 
behavior in the current interactions the same 
information on past behavior can be implemented in 
many ways. We therefore explore whether there are (1) 
seller and buyer strategies that are more successful than 
other strategies and (2) successful strategies that are 
able to promote or impede the emergence of trust and 
cooperation among the trading population in general. 
Our aim is to answer the question of whether trust and 
cooperation can evolve in a market consisting of 
isolated and anonymous participants solely through a 
reputation system and without an external enforcer. 
Our focus lies less on the reputation system itself than 
on the conditions under which trust and cooperation 
evolve in the absence of an enforcer. 
Simulation Experiments 
In a population consisting of n agents, buyers and 
sellers interact with each other. The buyer population is 
the same size as the seller population (m = n/2). In one 
round, the two populations interact through every 
buyer being randomly matched with a seller. Hence, m 
interactions take place in one round. The interaction 
between a buyer and a seller is defined by a trust game 
(see Figure 1 and the description above) and the 
payoffs are set to T=5, R=3, P=1, S=0. 
If a transaction between a buyer and a seller has taken 
place, the buyer must rate the seller in the following 
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by the seller, the seller receives a negative rating (b = -
1). If the trust shown by the buyer has been honored by 
the seller, the seller receives a positive rating (b = 1). 
Note that the buyer is never rated by the seller and a 
seller to whom trust was refused is not rated either. 
A generation consists of a specified number of rounds. 
In every round an agent interacts with a randomly 
assigned opponent. Given those parameters, it is 
improbable that the same buyer-seller pair will occur 
twice in a generation. Repeated interactions between 
the same two agents are therefore not accounted for. In 
every interaction, the buyers decide on the basis of an 
individually defined strategy whether to trust the sellers 
or not. In every transaction that takes place as a result 
of the trust shown by the buyers, the sellers decide on 
the basis of their own individually defined strategies 
whether to honor the buyer’s trust or not. 
Sellers only know their own interaction history. Thus 
sellers do not know how often a buyer showed no trust. 
They do, however, know something about the mistrust 
of buyers in general, since they know how often they 
were exposed to it themselves. Buyers know their own 
interaction history and the whole transaction history of 
the sellers with whom they interacted within the same 
generation. Explicitly, the buyers know the number of 
negative (u) and positive (v) ratings a seller has 
received, as well as his reputation index r. The 
reputation index r is calculated from his positive 
ratings as a fraction of the total number of his 
transactions (r = v / (u + v)). A seller who has not yet 
engaged in a transaction has no ratings and, as a 
consequence, a reputation index of r = 0. 
The buyer population and the seller population each 
consist of m = 256 agents. In every generation, every 
seller and every buyer is involved in k interactions (the 
length of a generation is therefore k rounds). In order to 
avoid end-round effects, the generation length is not 
known before the simulation is executed. At the 
beginning of the first generation, the buyer strategies 
are distributed in equal proportions throughout the 
buyer population; the same applies to the distribution 
of seller strategies in the seller population. At the end 
of every generation, the payoffs that all agents with the 
same strategy have obtained are summed into a total 
score. Then, in the next generation the strategies are 
distributed throughout the population of buyer and 
seller agents respectively, in proportion to the scores 
they have obtained. Neither history, ratings nor the 
reputation of a parent agent are transferred to a child 
agent in the next generation. 
Results 
First, we conduct simple scenario experiments in which 
we test different ad-hoc buyer and seller strategies. 
Therewith, we explore the effects on the level of trust 
and cooperation in the system the properties of the 
employed strategies and the combination of those have. 
Second, we arrange tournaments and ask participants to 
submit their own strategies to compete against other 
strategies. The tournament approach allows us both to 
make use of “distributed natural intelligence” in 
deriving challenges to the mechanisms of our artificial 




In the first scenario experiment we start with a buyer 
population, half of which consists of agents who 
always give trust to a seller (ALL C). The other half is 
composed of agents who never give trust to a seller 
(ALL D) (see Figure 2a). The seller population in turn 
is dominated by agents that always honor trust. 
However, one percent of the seller population consists 
of agents that never honor trust given by a buyer (see 
Figure 2b). Although the initial fraction of 
untrustworthy sellers is very small, these sellers 
manage to invade the population of trustworthy sellers 
after 15 generations.  
At first, the seller population is trustworthy at a very 
high rate. Agents playing ALL D in the buyer 
population die out quite early because giving trust is a 
more successful strategy. After the distrustful buyers 
have died out, the abuse of trust starts to spread over 
the seller population. Figure 2c shows that in the 
beginning, trust is honored at a very high rate, but 
disappears from the market after the mistrustful buyers’ 
interactions in which no trust is given. What is left is a 
market of exploiting sellers and exploitable buyers. 
 
 
Figure 2a: Fractions of strategy types in the buyer population for 
100 generations 
 
Figure 2b: Fractions of strategy types in the seller population for 
100 generations 
                                           
1 In the scenario experiments the number of rounds in one generation 
(k) was 10 and for the tournaments the generation length amounted 
to k=100 rounds. 
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Figure 2c: Fractions of transaction types for 100 generations 
 
Scenario 2 
In order to protect trustful buyers from exploitation, we 
introduce a rating mechanism and a buyer strategy 
which accounts for a seller’s reputation. The initial 
seller population in scenario 2 consists one half each of 
trustful and deceitful sellers (see Figure 3b). The buyer 
population contains, besides the two unconditional 
strategies ALL C and ALL D, the strategy RT 25. 
Strategy RT 25 only gives trust to a seller whose 
reputation index is greater than or equal to r = 0.25.
2 
The initial fraction of both unconditional strategies is 
46% of the buyer population. Accordingly, RT 25 
starts at a fraction of 8% of the buyer population (see 
Figure 3a). 
From the beginning, buyers playing RT 25 discriminate 
against sellers who do not have a positive reputation. 
This causes a decrease of the fraction of sellers playing 
ALL D on the one hand and an increasing fraction of 
buyers playing RT 25 on the other hand. The strategy 
RT 25 is more successful than ALL C because it does 
not get exploited by deceitful sellers. As soon as there 
are enough trustful sellers and a low rate of sellers 
playing ALL D respectively, buyers playing ALL C 
become more successful. Because of their 
unconditional cooperation, buyers playing ALL C also 
give trust to sellers without a reputation whereas 
buyers playing RT 25 do not cooperate with sellers 
who have not yet established a positive reputation. 
With the rising success of buyers playing ALL C, 
sellers playing ALL D have more opportunities to 
abuse trust and in turn become more successful 
themselves. At the peak of the deceitful sellers’ 
success, again, the fraction of buyers playing RT 25 
increases while the fraction of buyers playing ALL C 
decreases. This coevolutionary dynamics is well 
mapped by the transaction frequencies depicted in 
Figure 3c. In terms of the interdependence between the 
abuse of trust, reputation, mistrust, and trust, the 
dynamics can be described as follows. Starting with a 
growing rate of abused trust, the reputation mechanism 
ensures untrustworthy sellers to be recognized and 
discriminated against. A rising rate of mistrust due to 
the distrustful buyers’ preference of sellers with a 
positive reputation is followed by a more confident 
buyer population and a higher rate of honored trust. 
The approximate averages of transaction frequencies 
level off at 60% for Honored Trust, 25% for Mistrust 
and 15% for Abused Trust. 
 
 
Figure 3a: Fractions of strategy types in the buyer population for 
200 generations 
 
Figure 3b: Fractions of strategy types in the seller population for 
200 generations 
 
Figure 3c: Fractions of transaction types for 200 generations 
 
However, if the initial fraction of agents playing RT 25 
is below 7%, buyers playing ALL C die out too early, 
depriving trustworthy sellers of the possibility to build 
a good reputation. Without a reputation, the strategy 
RT 25 is not able to distinguish between trustworthy 
and deceitful sellers and therefore would never give 
trust in any interaction. Without trustful buyers no 
transactions take place and without transactions a 
market does not persist. 
 
Scenario 3 
The results from scenario 2 suggest that trustworthy 
sellers must get the opportunity to build a positive 
reputation. Otherwise, conditional strategies like RT 25 
would not be able to distinguish between trustworthy 
and deceitful sellers. A buyer strategy which 
incorporates that ability and, at the same time, gives 
sellers without a reputation the opportunity to prove 
their trustworthiness, is independent of the existence of 
a more trustful strategy like ALL C. In this scenario, 
we introduce the strategy RT 25 C. The only difference 
between RT 25 and RT 25 C is that RT 25 C 
unconditionally cooperates in its first interaction. 
Additionally, the initial fraction of buyer agents 
playing RT 25 C is 6%. Note that at this initial level, 
the strategy RT 25 failed to establish and maintain a 
system based on trust and cooperation. 
                                           
2 RT stands for Reputation Threshold. Note, the actual threshold does 
not matter here since ALL D has always a reputation index of r = 0 
and ALL C one of r=1, except in the first round of a generation. 
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in buyer strategies. Indeed, the fraction of buyers 
playing ALL C decreases and the strategy RT 25 C is 
more successful in this regard. However, it is not self-
evident that the success of RT 25 C implies a higher 
rate of trust and cooperation. RT 25 C, with its single 
unconditional cooperation is not contingent on 
confiding buyers playing ALL C and, at the same time, 
is more successful because not exploitable. Since ALL 
C fails to survive in the buyer population, the deceitful 
seller strategy ALL D is not able to persist either. What 
is left, is a functioning market with trustful but cautious 
buyers and trustworthy sellers. 
 
 
Figure 4a: Fractions of strategy types in the buyer population for 
100 generations 
 
Figure 4b: Fractions of strategy types in the seller population for 
100 generations 
 
Figure 4c: Fractions of transaction types for 100 generations 
 
The scenario experiments show that, despite the lack of 
an external sanctioning authority, cooperation evolves 
under two conditions. On the one hand, a minimal 
fraction of buyers must make use of the sellers’ 
reputation in their buying strategies. On the other hand, 
trustworthy sellers must be given opportunities to gain 
a good reputation through their cooperative behavior. 
Strategies which account for both these requirements 
turn out to be successful and conducive to a market 
based on trust and cooperation at the same time. 
 
Tournaments 
By organizing round-robin tournaments, we aim to find 
new seller and buyer strategies that in competing with 
each other challenge our artificial market system. 
Strategies were collected at four different occasions 
and were mostly handed in by students or graduates 
from different universities and faculties. In every 
tournament, the best buyer and seller strategy could 
win a book token that amounted to 20 Euros. The rules 
to the tournament were told in writing and contained 
virtually the same information as the section describing 
the simulation experiments. Figures 5a, b, and c, show 
a typical run of a tournament with 11 buyer and 22 
seller strategies – all strategies that have been handed 
in so far.  
KELLER, the winning seller strategy (see Figure 5b), 
rewards trust three times in a row and abuses it twice 
subsequently. Then it increases its cooperative and 
fraudulent periods by one. From now on it repeats this 
behavior persistently. KELLER’s rate of cooperation is 
at 60% in the beginning and decreases continuously to 
50%. The winning strategy in the buyer population (see 
Figure 5a), SKOPEKB, is an expected value strategy. It 
takes the reputation index of the seller as the seller’s 
willingness to cooperate and gives trust only if its 
expected payoff from a transaction with that seller is 
greater than or equal to the payoff for not giving trust 
(P ≤ rR + (1-r)S). Solving for r reveals that SKOPEKB 
corresponds to a RT-strategy with a reputation 
threshold at 1/3. Note that SKOPEKB always gives 
trust to KELLER since KELLER’s reputation index 
never falls below 0.5.
3  
These results are similar to those we obtained in many 
other constellations of buyer and seller strategies. In 
the seller population, those strategies which first build 
a reputation good enough to attract trustful buyers and 
exploit these buyers subsequently are the most 
successful ones. Accordingly, in the buyer population, 
strategies which apply the expected value principle in 
order to evaluate the trustworthiness of their interaction 
partner and to decide whether to give trust or to refuse 
it on the basis of that evaluation seem mostly to 
succeed. 
In further experiments, the successive introduction of 
RT-strategies with an ever higher reputation threshold 
indeed reduced the fraction of fraudulent transactions. 
However, above a certain level, RT-strategies died out 
too early and other more forgiving buyer strategies 
were successful. 
 
                                           
3 Besides SKOPEKB, the strategy JANN applies the expected value 
principle. The strategy STADELMANNB which corresponds to a 
RT-Strategy with a reputation threshold at 1/3 is virtually identical to 
SKOPEKB and therefore is not considered here. 
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Figure 5a: Fractions of strategy types in the buyer population for 
200 generations 
 
Figure 5b: Fractions of strategy types in the seller population for 
200 generations 
 
Figure 5c: Fractions of transaction types for 200 generations 
Discussion 
Despite the availability of data on the internet, the 
question of whether a reputation system alone allows 
an internet auction market to function can hardly be 
addressed by its analysis. The extent to which the 
operator of an internet-auction platform is able to keep 
the market participants from behaving opportunistically 
cannot be observed or manipulated. Therefore, we 
research this question with simulation experiments. 
Our agent-based model consists of a buyer and a seller 
population with agents applying different buyer and 
seller strategies. Seller and buyer agents meet several 
times in one generation. At every interaction they play 
the trust game with the seller as the second mover. If a 
transaction took place, the buyer rates the seller. The 
ratings determine a seller’s reputation index which can 
be accounted for by buyers in subsequent interactions 
with that seller. However, repeated interactions 
between the same two agents are ignored in our setting. 
Through ecological analysis we explore different 
strategies in terms of their success and their 
contribution to supporting or impeding trust and 
cooperation.  
Our scenario experiments reveal that trust and 
cooperation can evolve under two conditions. Some 
minimal fraction of buyers must make use of the 
sellers’ reputation in their buying strategies and 
trustworthy sellers must be given opportunities to gain 
a good reputation through their cooperative behavior. 
Buyer strategies which account for both these 
requirements turn out to be successful and conducive to 
a market based on trust and cooperation. None the less, 
our artificial market is not immune against deceitful 
sellers. The results from round-robin tournaments with 
many different buyer and seller strategies show that 
seller strategies which first build up a good reputation 
and exploit trustful buyers subsequently are successful. 
Even buyer strategies which only cooperate with sellers 
with a high reputation are no remedy for deceitful 
sellers since other less restrictive buyer strategies are 
more successful. However, after all, buyer strategies 
which apply the expected value principle succeed in the 
buyer population. 
Our results therefore suggest that cooperation can be 
established to a large extent – but not completely – in 
the absence of an external enforcer. A small number of 
deceitful sellers are able to hold their ground even in 
the presence of a reputation mechanism. These findings 
deviate from those produced by the tournaments 
conducted by Robert Axelrod (1984) in that they 
provided evidence for niches in which deceitful 
strategies can survive and persist. 
Bibliography 
Axelrod, R. 1984, The Evolution of Cooperation, New 
York: Basic Books 
Berger, R. and Schmitt, K. 2005, “Vertrauen bei 
Internetauktionen und die Rolle von Reputation, 
Informationen, Treuhandangebot und Preisniveau“. 
In  Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und 
Sozialpsychologie 57, pp. 86-111 
Bolton, G.E., Katok, E. and Ockenfels, A. 2004, “Trust 
among Internet Traders: A Behavioral Economics 
Approach”. In Analyse & Kritik 26, pp. 185-202 
Bolton, G.E., Katok, E. and Ockenfels, A. 2005, 
“Cooperation among Strangers with Limited 
Information about Reputation”. In Journal of 
Public Economics 89, pp. 1457-1468 
Brinkmann, U. and Meifert, M. 2003, “Vertrauen bei 
Internet-Auktionen. Eine kritische Stellungnahme“. 
In  Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und 
Sozialpsychologie 55, pp. 557-565 
  6  7
Buskens, V. and Raub, W. 2002, “Embedded Trust: 
Control and Learning”. In Group Cohesion, Trust 
and Solidarity 19, pp. 167-202 
Coleman, J.S. 1990, Foundations of Social Theory, 
Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press 
Dasgupta, P. 2000, “Trust as a Commodity”. In 
Gambetta, D., ed., Trust: Making and Breaking 
Cooperative Relations, electronic edition. 
Department of Sociology, University of Oxford. 
http://www.sociology.ox.ac.uk/papers/dasgupta49-
72.pdf 
Diekmann, A. and Wyder, D. 2002, “Vertrauen und 
Reputation bei Internet-Auktionen“. In Kölner 
Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 54, 
pp. 674-693 
Lahno, B. 1995, “Trust and Strategic Rationality”. In 
Rationality and Society 7, pp. 442-464 
Leimar, O. and Hammerstein, P. 2001, “Evolution of 
Cooperation through Indirect Reciprocity”. In 
Proceedings of the Royal Society London B 268, pp. 
745-753 
Nowak, M.A. and Sigmund, K. 1998, “Evolution of 
Indirect Reciprocity by Image Scoring”. In Nature 
393, pp. 573-577 
Resnick, P. and Zeckhauser, R. 2002, “Trust Among 
Strangers in Internet Transactions: Empirical 
Analysis of eBay's Reputation System”. In The 
Economics of Internet and E-Commerce 11, pp. 
127-157 
Snijders, C. and Zijdeman, R. 2004, “Reputation and 
Internet Auctions: eBay and Beyond”. In Analyse & 
Kritik 26, pp. 158-184 
Wedekind, C. and Milinski, M. 2000, “Cooperation 
through Image Scoring in Humans”. In Science 
288, pp. 850-852  
Author biographies 
Andreas Diekmann is Professor of Sociology at the 
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich. His 
areas of research are rational choice and experimental 
game theory, research methods and statistics, 
environmental sociology, demography and labor 
market research. 
Wojtek Przepiorka is doctoral candidate in sociology 
at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich. 
His research interests include behavioral game theory 
and agent-based modeling and simulation with 
applications in the social sciences. 